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Abstract
This is a general philosophical paper where I overview
some ideas concerning the non-reflexive foundations of quan-
tum mechanics (NRFQM). By NRFQM I mean formalism
and an interpretation of QM that considers an involved on-
tology of non-individuals as explained in the text. Thus, I
do not endorse a purely instrumentalist view of QM, but
believe that it speaks of something, and then I try to show
that one of the plausible views of this ‘something’ is as en-
tities devoid of identity conditions.
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1 Introduction
A typical way of looking to a scientific theory may be this one:1
it consists of a triple T = 〈F ,M,R〉, where F is a mathemat-
ical formalism (the mathematical counterpart of T ), M is the
class of its models, that is, the ‘realizations’ or the ‘interpreta-
tions’ of the theory, and R represents the set of connection rules
which provide the links between the interpretations and the for-
malism. This is of course just a general scheme that guides us
to look to some theories from a very general point of view. Dif-
ferently from mathematics, physical theories demand the expla-
nation of (at least) one possible realization. Quantum mechanics
(QM) would be not different. Below we shall see the details.
If we considere a purely instrumentalist point of view (some-
times associated to Bohr), we can say that QM just provides us
with ways of computing probabilities. But this is a radical ‘phys-
ical’ point of view; in general, philosophers aim at to discuss the
kind (or kinds) of world(s) QM tells us about. In doing that, we
are faced with interesting and counter-intuitive ways of looking
to the objects that form our ‘quantum reality’. Let me explain this
point a little bit, so directing the discussion to that I wish to em-
phasize. Firstly, I invite you to agree that Sunny Auyang is right
when she says that “physical theories are about things” ([Auy95,
p. 152]) for, if not, we would be speaking of a purely mathemati-
cal theory. But, of which kind of things are we speaking about?
To enlighten the point, let me recall one of Arnold Scharzneg-
ger’s films, The 6th Day where, coming back to home, he discov-
ers that there is someone in his place, a perfect copy of him.2 The
clone act he does, interacts with his wife and sons as he does,
1Several general characterizations of a scientific theories that apply to most
of them were proposed in the literature. In a certain sense, all of them coincide
in their main aspects to ours. See for instance [DalTor81], [KraAre16].
2The story (or history) of Martin Guerre, a Frenchman who lived in the XVI
century and which was also substituted by an imposter, is told by Amanda
Gefter in ”Quantum mechanics is putting human identity on trial: if our par-
ticles have no identity, how can we have?”, Nautilus.
puts out the trash as he does, etc. His family does not perceive
any difference, and really believe that the person they are inter-
acting with is Adam (the name of the character). But, is he not
Adam? To his family, all that imports is that all happens as if the
person in the house looks as Adam, acts as Adam, etc. That is all.
But, you may say, the person in the house is not Adam, but just
someone quite similar to him.
Let us go to another example: imagine that someone very rich
buys a painting (supposedly) by Picasso and then realize that it
is not a legitime Picasso but a copy, a very good one. Okay, you
can say: no problem. The copy is not a Picasso, but just a copy.
But suppose that Picasso has produced two very similar paint-
ings, one of them acquired by our personage, and that only after
the guy has acquired it the second copy appears, and that the
specialists are with difficulties to verify the legitimacy of the sec-
ond painting. What could happen? Probably the the painting
(both) would lose their value. Perhaps not, who knows? What
imports is that, apparently, identity matters:3 independently of
the similarities, just one of the guys is Adam, just one of the
paintings is the original Picasso and in the case of two Picasso’s,
something else happens: the value of the painting may decrease.
Furthermore, the two paintings can be discerned one each other,
for some (yet small) difference in tones, in traces or whatever
else would be present. With ordinary objects or our scale, ap-
parently Leibniz’s celebrated Principle of the Identity of Indis-
cernibles holds.
Concerning quantum objects, things are different. Although
we know the no-cloning theorem [WooZur82], all electrons are
electrons-Adam, all protons are protons-Adam, and so on. They
don’t present any intrinsic difference, but are perfectly alike (sup-
posing of course that it makes sense to speak of them as ‘things’
of some kind).4 Yes, you can say that certain quantum objects
3But see below for I will question even this thesis.
4An useful characterization of quantum particles, adopted by most physi-
cists, was given by E. Wigner in 1939 using group theory [Wig59]; see [Cas94].
of the same kind, as two electrons (and for other fermions in
general), contrarily to bosons, cannot partake the same quantum
state since they must obey Pauli’s Principle, hence they do present
differences for according to this principle, no fermions can par-
take the same quantum numbers in a same situation. But the
problem must be put rightly: think of the two electrons of an He-
lium atom in its fundamental state. The two electrons are in a
superposed state, and yet so they differ by their values of spin in
a given direction. But the question is that no one can say which
is which.5 Even if we call one of them ‘Paul’ and the other ‘Pe-
ter’, before a measurement it is impossible to say which electron
is Paul and which one is Peter, contrary to the two supposed Pi-
casso’s paintings, for we can write ‘Peter’ in the back of one of
them, something we cannot do with electrons.6 Things are worst
for bosons, for they may share all their quantum numbers (like
in a BEC, a Bose-Einstein Condensate [Ket et al.99]), being abso-
lutely indistinguishable by all means provided by the theory and
perhaps by any means at all. Identity, here, seems to make no
sense.
But, what identity? I mean the intuitive idea of a perfect char-
acterization of an object as a sole object. According to our pre-
ferred metaphysics (a Leibnizean one), things having identity are
always different from any other things, and can be recognized as
such in different situations. Although sometimes we cannot say
in what the difference consists of (more on this below), we tend
to suppose that it exists. As we shall see soon, this hypothesis
is encoded in our metaphysical pantheon. But let me insist on
the nature of quantum objects. Think for instance in the methane
combustion:
CH4 + 2O2 → CO2 + 2H2O.
Here, the four oxygen atoms of the two oxygen molecules will
5And this is not a simple epistemological problem. In assuming this, we
should agree in admitting hidden variables of a kind.
6A long time ago, Shro¨dinger stressed that “you cannot mark an electron,
you cannot paint it red” [Sch53].
contribute in the reaction so that two of then will form the car-
bon dioxide molecule and the other two will form the two water
molecules. But, which ones? It does not matter. All oxygen (hy-
drogen, carbon, electrons, protons, etc.) act the same way in the
same circumstances. As another exemple, think of an ionization
process of a neutral helium atom. One of its electrons may be
realized from the atom in order to form a positive ion. Later, an
electron can be captured by the ion in order to form a neutral
atom again. What is the difference between the first and the sec-
ond neutral atoms ou between the realized electron and the ab-
sorbed one? None. There are no differences at all! If there were
differences, chemistry would not work as it does. A long time
ago (1803), John Dalton has put things clear when he stressed
that
“[w]hether the ultimate particles of a body, such as
water, are all alike, that is, of the same figure, weight,
etc. is a question of some importance. From what
is known, we have no reason to apprehend a diver-
sity in these particulars: if it does exist in water, it
must equally exist in the elements constituting water,
namely, Hydrogen and Oxygen. Now it is scarcely
possible to conceive how the aggregates of dissimilar
particles should be so uniformly the same. If some of
the particles of water were heavier than others, if a
parcel of the liquid on any occasion were constituted
principally of these heavier particles, it must be sup-
posed to affect the specific gravity of the mass, a cir-
cumstance not known. Similar observations may be
made on other substances. Therefore we may con-
clude that the ultimate particles of all homogeneous
bodies are perfectly alike in weight, figure, etc. In
other words, every particle of water is like every other
particle of water, every particle of Hydrogen is like
every other particle of Hydrogen, etc.” [Dal08, pp.142-
3]
Quantum objects do not behave as the objects of our scale.
They are quite strange.
2 Is identity really so fundamental?
The title of this section is the title of a paper I wrote with my col-
league Jonas Arenhart [KraAre15]. We discuss and contest and
idea that the notion of identity is fundamental, as advanced by
O. Bueno [Bue14]. I will not repeat the arguments of the paper
here, but provide a mix of related ideas instead.
Standard objects of our surroundings, we believe, do have iden-
tity, they are individuals. This informally means that they have
their own characteristics which distinguish them from any other
object, although a quite similar one, and they can (in principle)
be re-identified several times as being that individual. This is due
to their identity. This belief is one of the most celebrated meta-
physical assumptions of Western philosophy already mentioned
above, namely, the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII),
which has its routs in the antiquity, but was celebrated in Leib-
niz’s philosophy.7 PII says that no two objects can have all the
same properties, that there are no solo numero distinct objects.
Objects having the same properties are indistinguishable, or in-
discernible, while identical objects are the very same object. PII
makes these concepts equivalent. As Rodriguez-Pereyra says,
“the principle states there cannot be numerically distinct but per-
fectly similar things, or that there cannot be two perfectly similar
things” [Per.14, p.15 fn.1]. Classical logic and standard mathe-
matics, that is, that one which can be build, say, in a standard
set theory like the Zermelo-Fraenkel with the Axiom of Choice
system (ZFC), incorporates PII in some way; we can say that it
is a theorem of classical logic (and classical mathematics). Every
object in ZFC (either if it involves or not the Urelemente, entities
that are not sets but which can be elements of sets — see [Sup72])
7Max Jammer suggests that PII has its roots with the Stoics; see [Jam66, p.].
is an individual in the sense of obeying PII. More precisely, by
obeying the standard theory of identity of ZFC, which if formu-
lated as a first-order theory, formalizes the behavior of a binary
primitive relational symbol ‘=’ by means of the following postu-
lates: (1) Reflexivity: ∀x(x = x); (2) Substitutivity: ∀x∀y(x =
y → (α(x) → α(y))), where α(x) is a formula with x free and
α(y) results from α(x) by the substitution of y in some free oc-
currences of x, and (3) the Axiom of Extensionality: ∀x∀y(∀z(z ∈
x ↔ z ∈ y) → x = y). In order to prove that every object in
ZFC is an individual, it suffices to acknowledge that given any
object a (represented in ZFC either by a set or by an Urelement),
we can form the unitary set {a} and define the following prop-
erty, which I call ‘the identity of a’, namely, Ia(x) ↔ x ∈ {a}. It
is obvious that the only object obeying Ia is a itself; so, any other
object will have a difference with a and PII holds.
Good for mathematics. If in discussing arithmetics ‘my’ num-
ber two is different from ‘yours’, we shall have some troubles, yet
we both acknowledge that there are different and non equivalent
way of defining ‘two’ (for instance, Frege’s, Russell’s, Zermelo’s,
von Neumann’s definitions, and so on). But in a same context,
we can agree that the two twos are the same. But for empiri-
cal sciences, I guess that we don’t need a so strong assumption;
worst, in assuming the standard theory of identity as true for em-
pirical objects in general, mainly in regarding quantum objects,
we shall face some problems I will touch on below. Firstly let me
recall that long time ago David Hume made things clear (in my
opinion) when he discussed the identity of objects in his Treatise
[Hum85, Book I, passim]. In short, he said that there is nothing
in an object that justifies our belief that it continues to be itself
after two successive observations, the second one after an instant
in which the object leaves our field of perception. We can say
that it is only a postulate of ours that things happen this way. In-
terestingly enough, Schro¨dinger had a similar position when he
stressed that
“[w]hen a familiar object reenters our ken, it is usu-
ally recognized as a continuation of previous appear-
ances, as being the same thing. The relative perma-
nence of individual pieces of matter is the most mo-
mentous feature of both everyday life and scientific
experience. If a familiar article, say an earthenware
jug, disappears from your room, you are quite sure
that somebody must have taken it away. If after a time
it reappears, you may doubt whether it really is the
same one − breakable objects in such circumstances
are often not. You may not be able to decide the issue,
but you will have no doubt that the doubtful same-
ness has an indisputable meaning − that there is an
unambiguous answer to your query. So firm is our
belief in the continuity of the unobserved parts of the
string!” [Sch98, p.204]
It seems that, for physics at least, identity of objects in time
cannot be proven logically; for physics at least (not for art or
human relationships) what imports is that once we have an ob-
ject, an indistinguishable one serves as well. So, we need to as-
sume that indistinguishable objects should exist in some way.
The problem with this idea is mathematics (and logic) for, as we
have seen, PII entails that indistinguishable objects are the very
same object; in other words, in ZFC there is not legitimate (solo
numero) indistinguishable objects. We shall see why next.
3 Indistinguishability within classical logic
Let us consider a structure E = 〈S, Ri〉, i ∈ I, built in ZFC. A
structure of this kind may admit automorphisms other than the
identity function (which is of course an automorphism in every
structure). For instance, think of a group structure G = 〈G, ?〉.
An automorphism of G is a bijective mapping h : G → G such
that (i) h(x ? y) = h(x) ? h(y), (ii) h(e) = e (where e is the iden-
tity element of the group), and (iii) h(x′) = (h(x))′, where x′ is
the inverse element of x. For instance, take the group defined by
Z = 〈Z,+〉 whereZ is the set of the integers and + the standard
addition on this set. Then h : Z → Z defined by h(x) = −x
is an automorphism of Z , as is easy to prove. If h is an au-
tomorphism of the structure E and h(a) = b for a, b ∈ S, we
say that a and b are E -indistinguishable. Thus, 2 and −2 are Z-
indistinguishable. From the point of view of the structure, that
is, from within the structure, there are no ways of distinguishing
between a and b: they look the same, for they are invariant by
the structures’ automorphisms. But, are they identical? This of
course happens only if there is just one automorphism, namely,
the identity function. In this case, we say that the structure is
rigid. The interesting thing to recall is that in ZFC every struc-
ture can be extended, by adding new relations, to a rigid one.
This intuitively means that we can always ‘go out’ the structure
and look its elements from the point of view of the outside, and
from this point of view, we can realize that the objects we initially
thought were indistinguishable, are not indistinguishable at all!
For instance, we can ‘rigidify’ the structure Z by adding the bi-
nary relation <, the usual linear order onZ; that is, the extended
structure Z ′ = 〈Z,+,<〉 is rigid, as is easy to see. The idea of
‘leaving out’ the structure is similar to go to another dimension;
in the 1884 book Flatland [Abo91], Edwin Abbott created a world
in two dimensions, and we can imagine a teenager character of
the story who is boring with every one else and decides to keep
closed in her room, alone. She supposes nobody can see her. But
we, in the third dimension, can. The same happens with our E -
indistinguishable objects; looking to the elements of the domain
from the extended structure, we can realize that they are not in-
distinguishable at all. And this can always be done! [CosRod07]
Within the ZFC framework, an object is indistinguishable just
from itself and remain so independently of what we ‘do’ with
them: they are individuals.
The moral of the story is this: within a standard mathemat-
ical framework such as ZFC, the only way of considering indis-
cernible objects is to confine the discussion to a non-rigid struc-
ture or something similar which is equivalent to admit as ‘iden-
tical’ those objects belonging to a same equivalence class relative
to some equivalence relation or to some congruence (other than
identity). This is precisely what the formalism of QM does when
postulates that only certain states are accessible to quantum ob-
jects. For instance, let us consider two indistinguishable bosons
and two possible states A and B. The configuration space is the
tensor product Hilbert space H = H1 ⊗H2, where Hi (i = 1, 2)
are the state spaces of bosons 1 and 2 respectively. Note that
in order to speak of them, we need to name them, say by call-
ing them ‘boson 1’ and ‘boson 2’. But these names cannot make
them entities with individuality, so we need to provide a mathe-
matical trick in order these names lose their individuation roles.
This is done by assuming that vectors like ψA1 ⊗ ψB2 and ψA2 ⊗ ψB1 ,
meaning respectively that particle 1 is at state A and particle 2
is in B, and that particle 2 is at state A and particle 1 is in B,
are not accessible to the particles. Furthermore, these vectors are
(in general) different, for the tensor product is not commutative.
So, the indiscernibility of the particles cannot be preserved, for it
would be a different situation either we consider that particle 1 is
at state A and particle 2 is in B or that particle 2 is at state B and
particle 1 is in A. These vectors do not represent possible states
for the join system; in the terminology introduced by Michael
Redhead, these vectors are examples of surplus structures, objects
resulting from the formalism that have no physical significance
(see [RedTel91]). The ‘right’ states are (1) ψA1 ⊗ ψA2 , meaning that
both are in A, (2) ψB1 ⊗ ψB2 , meaning that both are in B, and (iii)
1√
2
(ψA1 ⊗ ψB2 ± ψA2 ⊗ ψB1 ), the plus sign holding for bosons (sym-
metric states) and the minus sign for fermions (anti-symmetric
states — for fermions, this the only available state, due to Pauli’s
Principle). The situation (iii) says that one particle is in A and
that the another one is in B, but we cannot state which is which.
Thus, the formalism preserves Pauli’s Principle for fermions; al-
though a permutation of the particles changes the signal of the
whole vector, its square remains the same, and that is what im-
ports, for the square of the vector (or wave-function) gives us the
probabilities, according to Born’s well known rule.
In doing that, the formalism can be written having ZFC as
its mathematical (and logical) basis. Of course alternative frame-
works could be invoked instead, but ZFC suffices and is suffi-
ciently general for the considerations we have in mind. So, we
are performing a trick in assuming that only symmetric and anti-
symmetric vectors are available for quanta. This is similar to the
confinement of the discussion to a non-rigid structure.8
4 Ontology
The word ‘ontology’ has acquired a number of different mean-
ings in philosophy. Traditional philosophy has qualified it as
that part of metaphysics that studies the general structures of
what there is. In this sense, there cannot be distinct ontologies,
for what there is is what there is and things, in the sense of be-
ing, cannot have two distinct natures. But today we have rela-
tivized (or ‘naturalized’) the word to a certain theory or concep-
tion; thus we can say that, given a scientific theory, its ontology is
described by specifying the kind of entities the theory is compro-
mised with. In this sense, we can say that the standard formal-
ism of QM is compatible with many non-equivalent ontologies
(see [FreKra06] for a wide discussion) which can be aggregated
to the formalism as a kind of interpretation of it (an intended
semantics). The standard formalism (Hilbert spaces) does not
speak of quantum objects strictly speaking, but just of states and
observables, and we need to provide a parallel discussion (some-
times disliked by physicists) in order to answer simple questions
such as ‘states of what’? But, ‘logically speaking’, how can we
provide a semantics for the formalism? According to standard
8In [Dom et al.08] — see also [Dom et al.10] — we have started the devel-
opment of a formalism that dispenses labels to the particles. This is something
to be further explored.
semantic procedures (formal semantics), the first step is to define
a domain of discourse. For instance, we may suppose that we are
speaking of a collection of bosons or of another quantum system.
Let us fix a collection of indistinguishable bosons (all in the same
quantum state). Would this domain be a set? Remember what
Georg Cantor, the founder father of set theory, said about sets:
“by an ‘aggregate’ (Menge) we are to understand any collection
into a whole (Zusammenfassung zu einein Ganzen) M of definite and
separate objects m of our intuition or our thought”, my empha-
sis [Can55, p.85]. In ZFC, due to the Axiom of Extensionality,
the set {1, 1, 2, 3, 3, 3} is identical with the set {1, 2, 3} and has
cardinal 3.9 So, how to provide an adequate semantics for, say,
indistinguishable bosons? Hermann Weyl has found a way: he
has taken a set S, say with n elements, and an equivalence rela-
tion∼ defined on S. Then the equivalence classes C1, . . . , Ck have
cardinals n1, . . . , nk so that we have an ‘ordered decomposition’
n = ∑ki=1 ni (see [Wey49, p.240]) and, as he says, this would be
what imports to QM, that is, the quantity of elements in each state
(equivalence class), and not their individual description. The
equivalent classes play the role of characterizing indistinguish-
able elements of the collection, that is, elements of S that belong
to a same equivalence class are taken as indistinguishable. For a
discussion of this case, see [Kra91], [FreKra06]. But this is a trick,
for we know that the elements of S are all distinct from one each
other by fiat! Leibniz’s principle holds, and if we have a finite
number of objects, we may even ask for the differences. But, as
we know from QM, in certain situations there are none!
We may say that the differences are in logic. But, is logic mea-
surable? Things became difficult if we try to push deeper this
philosophical question. Thus, let me suggest an alternative. To-
9Let me recall that there is a multiset theory where an element can occur
more than once in a multiset, so that {1, 1, 2, 3, 3, 3} nas cardinal 6 [Bli88]. But
this does not fit QM (see [Kra91]), for the repeated objects are the very same
object, while in QM no one will agree that in a collection of indistinguishable
bosons, they are all the same boson. As we shall see below, words like ‘the
same’, ‘identical’, ‘different’ causes troubles here.
day most logicians and philosophers have no more fears in ad-
mitting different kinds of heterodox logics, that is, systems that
depart from classical logic in some way. Intuitionistic logic do
not accept the general validity of the excluded middle princi-
ple; paraconsistent logics do not accept the general validity of
the principle of contradiction. But the laws of identity are still
taken as a taboo. No one I know accepts to question them, and
more, to question the ancient metaphysical rule that there can-
not be truly indistinguishable objects. Why not to admit them,
at least logically? In the same vein as there is no logical proof
that there is no another perfectly similar Guernica hidden some-
where, an ontology composed by truly indistinguishable objects,
not made ad hoc by some trick as shown above, looks reasonable.
Perhaps such a metaphysics would fit well the claims of QM. So,
we are free to try to found a semantics for QM whose domain
comprises collections of indistinguishable objects. By the way,
as said David Hilbert, the mathematician (and the philosopher)
should investigate all possible theories [Hil02].
5 The inadequacy of the standard theory
of identity
Standard theory of identity says that two distinct objects present,
at least in principle, a difference in their qualities (that is, there is
a property obeyed by just one of them). If we have two of them,
they are different in this sense, yet we would not be able to spec-
ify the distinctive property. For instance, the bosons in a collec-
tion of bosons in the same state, if represented in ZFC, do present
differences, yet QM cannot tell us what are they. Remember: in
ZFC, if we have a set with more than one element, its elements
are different.
Let us fix this typical case, namely, a collection of indistin-
guishable bosons, say in a Bose-Einstein Condensate (a ‘BEC’).10
10A very interesting and didactic page on BECs is http://www.colorado.
A BEC can be obtained by freezing molecules or atoms near to
the absolute zero; in such a situation, the objects start acting as if
they were just one thing, a ‘big molecule’ [Ket et al.99]. They are
in the same quantum state and do not present any differences,
but they are not the same object!. But, let me insist, if we suppose
they obey the standard theory of identity, the differences exist,
yet not perceptible to us. In this case, we need to assume that
there is something (some kind of ‘variable’) hidden in the quan-
tum mechanical description (in the case, a quantum field theo-
retical description). But no physicist (I suppose) is comfortable
in assuming this. The bosons in a BEC do not present any differ-
ence, even a hidden one. So, it seems that they should not belong
to the class of objects that obey the standard theory of identity.
Of course Bohmian quantum mechanics (BQM) says differently,
for it agrees with the ‘classical’ metaphysics of individuals. In
BQM, all particles have positions that distinguish them one an-
other. The problem is that as Carlo Rovelli says, the particles ”do
not revel” their positions; they are hidden to us (and, we could
add, also to the gods) [Rov18, p.269, fn.55].
5.1 My proposal
What, them? In my opinion, the better way to deal with entities
of this kind is to separate the two notions that are merged in the
standard theory of identity: indistinguishability and identity. In-
distinguishable objects share properties; you and me apparently
are indistinguishable regarding the ‘property’ to have interest in
quantum physics. But for sure we have several other differences.
‘Truly’ indistinguishable objects do not present any difference by
definition; they share all their properties. Identical objects are
not distinct objects, but the same one. In other words, there is no
more than one object. In my opinion, the first concept is useful
in quantum physics, while the second one causes troubles, and
is useful (perhaps) only in mathematics, art and human relation-
edu/physics/2000/bec/what_is_it.html.
ships. In fact, if we assume the standard theory of identity for
bosons, we need to assume also the corresponding ‘theory of dif-
ference’ for them, which says that if we have two of them, a dif-
ference exists. But, which one? So, out of a purely metaphysical
hypothesis, in order to speak of a suitable semantics for quantum
languages, we need a mathematical theory were these two con-
cepts are not taken as equivalent. This theory is called quasi-set
theory we shall see below. But, first, let me say something about
the underlying logic of such a theory, a non-reflexive logic.
6 Non-reflexive logics, and Schro¨dinger
Generally speaking, non-reflexive logics are non-classical logics
that deviate from classical logic with respect to the notion of iden-
tity. Since we can have classical logic without identity (see [Men79]),
in order to characterize them it is necessary to provide a way to
modify in some sense the way classical logic deals with iden-
tity. And this may go as follows. If the logic does not con-
tain a primitive binary predicate to be interpreted as identity, we
chose a binary predicate of the language and associate to it the
diagonal of the domain of the interpretation D, namely, the set
∆D = {〈x, x〉 : x ∈ D}. If the logic comprises a primitive binary
predicate of identity, we associate the same set to it. The prob-
lem is that, in usual parlance, identity (the informal notion of
‘being the very same’) cannot be axiomatized. It means that we
can never know if the associated set is in fact the diagonal of the
domain or another set characterized as the quotient set of the do-
main by some congruence relation; the structures are elementary
equivalent, what means that the same sentences are true in both
of them (for details, see [Hod83], [Men79, p.83]). So, from the
point of view of the first order language, we cannot distinguish
between the two structures and, then, we never know if the pred-
icate of identity really stands for the diagonal of the domain, that
is, either we are speaking of the individuals of the domain or of
equivalence classes of them.
A typical way of departing from the standard notion of iden-
tity is to try to violate the Principle of Identity in some way. But
there is no the Principle of Identity, for it can be formulated in
several non equivalent ways. For instance, at the propositional
level, we can write p → p where p is a propositional variable. In
this case, we can interpret the implication as cause, prescribed by
suitable axioms (see [SylCos88]). That is, p → q is read p causes
q, and it is assumed that nothing can case itself, so, p → p does
not hold. Other systems can be obtained by considering the Prin-
ciple of Identity as formulated in a first order language, namely,
∀x(x = x), where x is an individual variable, also called the re-
flexive law of identity. The negation of this rule reads ∃x(x , x).
But we are not claiming that there is something which is not iden-
tical to itself; the principle can be violated simply by assuming
that the predicate of identity does not hold in general, that is, that
there may exist objects in the domain to which it does not make
sense to say that they are either equal or different. In this case,
x = y simply does not have sense. A typical case is Schro¨dinger’s
idea that the notion of identity does not have sense for elemen-
tary particles in quantum mechanics. This is the case we have
in mind. Inspired in this idea, we have developed Schro¨dinger
Logics in which the Principle of Identity in this first-order form
does not hold in general (for details and historical references, see
[FreKra06, chap.8]). The theory to be presented below incorpo-
rates this idea.
Other discussions on non-reflexive logics can be found in [CosBue09],
[KraAre18], [Kra94], and in the references therein.
7 Quasi-set theory
In this section I shall sketch a minimal nucleus of quasi-set theory
just to give to the reader a general idea of how it works. Later, I
shall say something about ‘quantum semantics’. In what follows,
ZFU stands for the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with Urelemente
[Sup72]. Thus, our intended domain comprises different kinds of
entities; standard ZFU is compatible with the existence of sets and
the Urelemente, or simply atoms. In the theory sketched below, Q,
there are two kinds of atoms; the M-atoms play the role of the
Urelemente of ZFU (and in the intended semantics stand for the
usual objects of our surroundings − at our scale, the individuals),
while the m-atoms have a different behavior, and will be thought
of as representing elementary particles (either in non-relativistic
quantum mechanics or in quantum field theories; both situations
can be covered by the formalism, although we shall be speaking
more of quantum mechanics). I will modify a little some already
presented versions of the theory, mainly in postulate (qc1), where
I have admitted the possibility that a collection may do not have a
cardinal (as in the case of quantum field theories, where creation
and anhilation operators are introduced). Another modification
is concerning the definition of extensional identity given below
(definition 7.1v).
Let us call Q a first order theory whose primitive vocabu-
lary contains, beyond the vocabulary of standard first order logic
without identity (propositional connectives, quantifiers, etc. −see
[Men79]), we have the following specific symbols: (1) three unary
predicates m, M, Z, (2) two binary predicates ∈ and ≡, (3) one
unary functional symbol qc. Notice once again that identity is not
part of the primitive vocabulary, and that the only terms in the
language are variables and expressions of the form qc(x), where
x is an individual variable, and not a general term.11 The intu-
itive meaning of the primitive symbols is given as follows:
(i) x ≡ y (x is indiscernible from y)
(ii) m(x) (x is a ‘micro-object’, or an m-atom)
(iii) M(x) (x is a ‘macro-object’ or an M-atom)
(iv) Z(x) (x is a ‘set’ − a copy of a ZFU set)
(v) qc(x) (the quasi-cardinal of x)
11This restriction avoids that, for instance, qc(qc(x)) turns to be a term.
The underlying logic ofQ is a kind of non-reflexive logic, where
the standard theory of identity does not hold (see [FreKra06, chap.
8], [Are14], [CosBue09]). Now, we introduce some definitions,
with the intuitive interpretation attributed to them.
Definition 7.1
(i) Q(x) := ¬(m(x) ∨M(x)) (x is a qset)
(ii) P(x) := Q(x) ∧ ∀y(y ∈ x → m(y)) ∧ ∀y∀z(y ∈ x ∧ z ∈
x → y ≡ z)
(x is a pure qset, having only indiscernible m-atoms as ele-
ments.
(iii) D(x) := M(x) ∨ Z(x)
(x is a Ding, a ‘classical object’ in the sense of Zermelo’s set
theory, namely, either a set or a ‘macro Urelement’.)
(iv) E(x) := Q(x) ∧ ∀y(y ∈ x → Q(y))
(x is a qset whose elements are qsets.)
(v) x =E y := (Z(x) ∧ Z(y) ∧ ∀z(z ∈ x ↔ z ∈ y)) ∨ (M(x) ∧
M(y) ∧ ∀Zz(x ∈ z↔ y ∈ z)) (Extensional identity)— we shall
write simply x = y instead of x =E y from now on. Notice
that the expression x = y, when either x or y is an m-atom, yet
it can be written, it does not have any meaning in the theory.12
The notion of identity applies just to sets and to M-atoms. Fur-
thermore, just to explain the terminology, sometimes I use rel-
ativized quantifiers: for instance, ∀Qxγ means ∀x(Q(x)→ γ),
while ∃Qxγ means ∃x(Q(x) ∧ γ); these same for predicates
other than Q.
(vi) x ⊆ y := ∀z(z ∈ x → z ∈ y) (subqset)
Important to realize here the conditional in this definition. Hav-
ing no identity, we may be in trouble in trying to prove that a
12This is similar to name R the collection R = {x : x < x} (Russell’s set),
which can be expressed in the language of ZFC but is not a set of this theory,
supposed consistent.
certain m-atom belongs to a quasi-set, for it should be identical
to some element of it. This fact does not matter for our pur-
poses. The definition says that if z belongs to x then z belongs
to y. In Q, it suffices to prove (or to assume) that there is an in-
discernible from z in x. For instance, in a Litium atom 1s22s1,
it suffices to say that there is one electron in the outer shell; it
does not matter which one.
As I have said, Q is a theory compatible with the existence
two kinds of ur-elements, the m-atoms and the M-atoms, and
also collections formed by either atoms or other collections, the
qsets, or by both, atoms and qsets. The theory does not postulate
the existence of atoms, as in the standard presentations of ZFU.
Some qsets are specially important: when their transitive closure
does not contain m-atoms, they contain only what we call ‘clas-
sical objects’ of the theory (objects satisfying D); items fulfilling
this condition satisfy the predicate Z and coincide with the sets
in ZFU. So, classical mathematics can be built insideQ, in its clas-
sical part.
The main idea motivating the development of the theory is
that some items are non-individuals (roughly speaking, entities
for which the standard notion of identity does not apply), and
does not obey the notion encapsulated in the definition of exten-
sional identity. As explained above this concept is not defined
for m-atoms, the items which intuitively represent quantum in-
distinguishable objects. Thus, on one side, these things ‘do not
have identity’, that is, it does not make sense to say they are
identical or different and, on the other side, the indistinguisha-
bility relation holds for every item of the theory, so m-atoms may
be indistinguishable without being identical. Important to notice
that in saying that some entities are non-individuals, we are not
supposing that we cannot speak of them; really, we can speak of
them, that is, we can write x = y even for m-atoms, but this ex-
pression does not have a sense according to the theory: it says
nothing. For instance, a qset of indiscernible m-atoms may have
a quasi-cardinal greater than one, say 5, and so we can think of
five entities in some situation, although they cannot be discerned
then in any way. Furthermore, quantified expressions must be
interpreted adequately; again in considering a qset of indistin-
guishable objects (say, bosons in a BEC), the universal quantifier
says ‘all elements of the BEC’, while the existential quantifier says
‘some element of the BEC’. Thus, universal quantification does
not mean ‘each’ element of the qset (which would presuppose
identity) as the standard interpretation suggest (for more on this
point, see [KraAre15]).
7.1 The postulates of Q
Besides postulates for classical first-order logic without identity
(which we shall not list here), we introduce the specific postulates
for Q.
(≡1) ∀x(x ≡ x)
(≡2) ∀x∀y(x ≡ y→ y ≡ x)
(≡3) ∀x∀y∀z(x ≡ y ∧ y ≡ z→ x ≡ z)
(=4) ∀x∀y(x = y → (α(x) → α(y))), with the usual restric-
tions.
The first three postulates say that indistinguishability is an
equivalence relation. Now, this relation is not necessarily com-
patible with other primitive predicates; so we can keep identity
and indistinguishability as distinct concepts. In fact, if x and y
are indistinguishable m-atoms and being z a qset, x ∈ z does not
entail that y ∈ z, and conversely. The fourth postulate says that
substitutivity holds only for identical things, that is, for ‘classical’
things.
Remark: Someone may say that we are presupposing identity
in the metalanguage when we say that variables x and y are dif-
ferent. This is true, but does not collapse the theory. We have a
similar situation for instance in paraconsistent logics [?], which
are logics apt to deal with contradictory sentences. That is, the
Principle of Contradiction in the form ¬(α ∧ ¬α) does not hold
in general. But, in elaborating such systems, we do use the prin-
ciple as being true, for no one would suggest that something is
a formula and is not a formula, say. In other words, nothing is a
formula and not a formula at once.
Other postulates are:
(∈1) ∀x∀y(x ∈ y→ Q(y))
If something has an element, then it is a qset; in other words,
the atoms have no elements (in terms of the membership rela-
tion).
(∈2) ∀Dx∀Dy(x ≡ y→ x = y)
Indistinguishable Dinge are extensionally identical. This makes
= and ≡ coincide for this kind of entities.
(∈3) ∀x∀y[(m(x)∧ x ≡ y→ m(y))∧ (M(x)∧ x = y→ M(y))∧
(Z(x) ∧ x = y→ Z(y))]
(∈4) ∃x∀y(¬y ∈ x)
This qset can be proved to be a set (in the sense of obeying the
predicate Z), and it is unique, as it follows from the axiom of
weak extensionality we shall see below. Thus, from now own
we shall denote it, as usual, by ‘∅’.
(∈5) ∀Qx(∀y(y ∈ x → D(y))↔ Z(x))
This postulate grants that something is a set (obeys Z) iff its
transitive closure does not contain m-atoms. That is, sets in Q
are those entities obtained in the ‘classical’ part of the theory.
(∈6) ∀x∀y∃Qz(x ∈ z ∧ y ∈ z)
(∈7) If α(x) is a formula in which x appears free, then
∀Qz∃Qy∀x(x ∈ y↔ x ∈ z ∧ α(x)).
This is the Separation Schema. We represent the qset y as fol-
lows:
[x ∈ z : α(x)].
When this qset is a set, we write, as usual, {x ∈ z : α(x)}.
(∈8) ∀Qx(E(x)→ ∃Qy(∀z(z ∈ y↔ ∃w(z ∈ w ∧ w ∈ x))).
The union of x, written
⋃
x. Usual notation is used in particu-
lar cases.
7.2 Some basic concepts
From (∈6), by the Separation Scheme using α(w)↔ w ≡ x∨w ≡
y, we get a subqset of z which we denote
[x, y]z
which is the qset of the indiscernibles of either x or y that belong
to z. When x ≡ y, this qset reduces to
[x]z
called the qset of the indiscernibles from x that belong to z. The
qset [x, y]z does not have necessarily only two elements (that is,
we may have qc([x, y]z) > 2), for there may be more than just one
indistinguishable from x or y in z. Given the qset z and one of its
elements, x, the collections [x] and [x]z stand for all indiscernible
from x and the qset of the indiscernible from x that belong to z
respectively. (Usually, [x] is too big to be a qset − as in general
are collections of all objects so and so, as in standard set theory.)
Later, with the postulates of quasi-cardinals, we will be able to
prove [x]z has a subqset whose quasi-cardinal equals to 1, written
~xz.
We call it the strong singleton of x (really, a strong singleton of
x, for we cannot grant that it is unique). It has just one element,
and we can think of this element as if it were x, but it follows
from the definition that all we can know is that ~xz contains one
object of the ‘species’ x. That is, qc(~xz) = 1, so there is one item
indistinguishable from x in this qset. To prove that this element
is x, we need identity.
7.3 Other postulates and definitions
(∈9) ∀Qx∃Qy∀z(z ∈ y↔ w ⊆ x),
The power qset of x, denoted P(x). Interesting here is that
we would be in trouble to teach quasi-set theory to children.
For instance, take a qset x with cardinal 2 so that its elements
(call them y and z) are indistinguishable. Now try to write the
qset P(x). You can’t do it significantly. Really, it results that
the two subsets with quasi-cardinal 1 are indistinguishable (by
the Weak Extensionality Axiom), so, something like P(x) =
[∅, [y], [z], x] has no clear sense. Even so, as we shall see from
axiom (qc7), the quasi-cardinal of P(x) is 4.
(∈10) ∀Qx(∅ ∈ x ∧ ∀y(y ∈ x → y ∪ [y]x ∈ x)),
The infinity axiom.
(∈11) ∀Qx(E(x) ∧ x , ∅→ ∃Qy(y ∈ x ∧ y ∩ x = ∅)),
The axiom of foundation, where x ∩ y is defined as usual.
Definition 7.2 (Weak ordered pair)
〈x, y〉z := [[x]z, [x, y]z]z (1)
Then, 〈x, y〉z takes all indiscernible from either x or y that be-
long to z, and it is called the ‘weak’ ordered pair, for it may have
more than two elements. Sometimes the sub-indice z will be left
implicit.
Definition 7.3 (Cartesian Product) Let z and w be two qsets. We
define the cartesian product z× w as follows:
z× w := [〈x, y〉z∪w : x ∈ z ∧ y ∈ w] (2)
Functions and relations cannot also be defined as usual, for
when there are m-atoms involved, a mapping may not distin-
guish between arguments and values. Thus we provide a wider
definition for both concepts, which reduce to the standard ones
when restricted to classical entities. Thus,
Definition 7.4 (Quasi-relation) A qset R is a binary quasi-relation
between to qsets z and w if its elements are weak ordered pairs of the
form 〈x, y〉z∪w, with x ∈ z and y ∈ w.
Definition 7.5 (Quasi-function) f is a quasi-function among q-sets
A and B if and only if f is quasi-relation between A and B such that for
every u ∈ A there is a v ∈ B such that if 〈u, v〉 ∈ f and 〈w, z〉 ∈ f
and u ≡ w then v ≡ z.
In words, a quasi-function maps indistinguishable elements
to indistinguishable elements. An interesting question concerns
the more specific kinds of functions, that is, injections, surjec-
tions and bijections. One can, with some restrictions, define the
corresponding concepts, but we shall not present them here (see
[FreKra06, chap. 7]).
7.4 Postulates for quasi-cardinals
Notice that in Q the standard notion of identity is not defined for
some entities (definition 7.1v). Now, the identity concept is es-
sential to define many of the usual set theoretic concepts of stan-
dard mathematics, such as well order, the ordinal attributed to a
well ordered set, and the cardinal of a collection. Since identity
is to be senseless for some items in Q, how can we employ these
notions? One alternative would be to look for different formu-
lations employing methods that do not rely on identity. Another
possibility would be to introduce these concepts as primitive and
give adequate postulates for them. Concerning the notion of car-
dinal, there are interesting issues we should acknowledge. First
of all, in Q, there cannot be well-orders on quasi-sets of indistin-
guishable m-atoms. Really, a well-order would imply, for exam-
ple, that there is a least element relative to this well order, a no-
tion which could only be formulated if identity was defined for
m-atoms, for this element would be different from any other ele-
ment in the quasi-set. Second, the usual claim that aggregates of
quantum entities can have a cardinal but not an ordinal demands
a distinction between the notions of ordinal and of cardinal of a
quasi-set; this distinction is made in Q by the introduction of car-
dinals as a primitive notion, called quasi-cardinals.13
Let us see the postulates for quasi-cardinals; for details and
motivations, see [FreKra06, Chap.7], [FreKra10]. Here α, β, . . .
stand for cardinals (defined as usual in the classical part of the
theory, that is, in the theory Qwhen we rule out the m-atoms):
(qc1) ∀Qx(∃Zy(y = qc(x))→ ∃!y(Cd(y)∧ y = qc(x)∧ (Z(x)→
y = card(x)))
In words, if the qset x has a quasi-cardinal, then its (unique)
quasi-cardinal is a cardinal (defined in the ‘classical’ part of
the theory) and coincides with the cardinal of x stricto sensu
if x is a set. As recalled above, this axiom does not grant that
every qset has a well defined quasi-cardinal.
(qc2) ∀Qx(∃y(y = qc(x)→ x , ∅→ qc(x) , 0)).
Every non-empty qset that has a quasi-cardinal has a non-null
quasi-cardinal.
(qc3) ∀Qx(∃Zα(α = qc(x)) → ∀β(β ≤ α → ∃Qz(z ⊆ x ∧
qc(z) = β)))
If x has quasi-cardinal α, then for any cardinal β ≤ α, there is
a subqset of x with that quasi-cardinal.
13As shown by Domenech and Holik, we can define quasi-cardinals for fi-
nite qsets in Q, without resulting that the qset will have an associated ordinal
in the usual sense; see [DomHol07].
In the remaining axioms, for simplicity, we shall write ∀Qqc x
(or ∃Qqc x) for quantifications over qsets x having a quasi-cardinal.
(qc4) ∀Qqc x∀Qqc y(y ⊆ x → qc(y) ≤ qc(x))
(qc5) ∀Qqc x∀Qqc y(Fin(x) ∧ x ⊂ y→ qc(x) < qc(y))
It can be proven that if both x and y have a quasi-cardinal,
then x ∪ y has a quasi-cardinal. Then,
(qc6) ∀Qqc x∀Qqc y(∀w(w < x ∨ w < y) → qc(x ∪ y) = qc(x) +
qc(y))
In the next axiom, 2qc(x) denotes (intuitively) the quantity of
subquasi-sets of x. Then,
(qc7) ∀Qqc x(qc(P(x)) = 2qc(x))
This last axiom enables us to think of subqsets of a given qset
in the usual sense; for instance, if qc(x) = 3, the axiom says that
there exists 23 = 8 subqsets, and axiom (qc3) enables us to think
that there are subqsets with 0, 1, 2 and 3 elements. Furthermore,
as we have seen above, in Q we can prove that given any object
a ∈ z (either an m-atom, M-atom or quasi-set) we may obtain the
strong singleton of a, ~az whose quasi-cardinal is 1. Important
to insist that there is no sense of saying, within Q, that a is the
only element of ~a, for in order to prove it we need identity.
Anyway, Q is consistent with this idea and we may reason as if
this is really so. So, we can think that within Q that we may have
a certain m-atom, without identifying it, except that it has some
characteristics or properties, and not others (for instance, it may
be discernible from another m-atom b). That m-atoms may have
different properties can be seen from the fact of Q that Q doesn’t
prove the Substitutivity of Indiscernibles, that is,
Q 0 a ≡ b→ ∀Qz(a ∈ z↔ b ∈ z).
To prove this result, it suffices to take ~az. Since qc(a) = 1,
a and b cannot belong both to this qset, except if a is identical
to b, which cannot be assumed in the case of m-atoms. So, in
an extensional context (and Q is also an extensional theory, al-
though this should be qualified), we can read a ∈ z as a having
a certain ‘property’ (whose ‘extension’ would be z). So, even in-
distinguishable m-atoms may have distinct properties, as the two
electrons in an Helium atom in its fundamental state have differ-
ent values of spin in a given direction. As for bosons, let a and
b name two bosons in a BEC. The first think to acknowledge is
that these names do not make sense, for they cannot individual-
ize the named bosons; furthermore, in Q, the strong singletons
~az and ~bz are indistinguishable (by the Weak Extensionality
Axiom below), hence there are no differences among them (yet
they are not the same quasi-set).
7.5 The Weak Extensionality Axiom
The weak extensionality axiom generalizes the usual extension-
ality axiom. Intuitively, it grants us that two q-sets with the same
quantity of the same kinds of elements are indistinguishable. For
that, we need two extra definitions, the notion of similarity be-
tween q-sets, denoted by Sim, and the notion of Q-similarity, de-
noted Qsim. Intuitively speaking, similar q-sets have elements
of the same kind, and q-similar q-sets have elements of the same
kind, and in the same quantity:
Definition 7.6
(i) Sim(x, y) := ∀z∀w(z ∈ x ∧ w ∈ y→ z ≡ y);
(ii) Qsim(x, y) := Sim(x, y) ∧ qc(x) = qc(y).
The weak extensionality axiom reads as follows:
(≡12) ∀Qx∀Qy((∀z(z ∈ x/≡ → ∃t(t ∈ y/≡ ∧ Qsim(z, t)))) ∧
∀t(t ∈ y/≡ → ∃z(z ∈ x/≡∧ ∧Qsim(t, z)))→ x ≡ y)
Intuitively speaking, qsets that have ‘the same quantity’ (given
by their q-cardinals) of elements of the same kind are indiscernible.
The following theorem express the invariance by permuta-
tions in Q, and with this result we finish our revision. To prove
it, we shall assume another result, namely, that y ⊆ t entails
qc(x− y) = qc(x)− qc(y); let us call this result Theorem (?) (the
proof can be found in [FreKra06, chap.7]). The theorem goes as
follows:
Theorem 7.1 (Invariance by Permutations) Let x be a finite qset
such that ¬(x = [z]t) for some t and let z be an m-atom such that
z ∈ x. If w ∈ t, w ≡ z and w < x, then there exists ~wt such that
(x− ~zt) ∪ ~wt ≡ x
Proof: Case 1: the only element of ~zt does not belong to x. Then
x − ~zt = x. Let w be so that its only element belongs to x (for
instance, it may be z). Then (x − ~zt) ∪ ~wt = x, hence the
theorem. Case 2: the only element of ~zt belongs to x. Then
qc(x− ~zt) = qc(x)− 1 by the mentioned theorem (?). Let ~wt
be such that its only element is w itself, so (x − ~zt) ∪ ~wt =
∅. Hence, by Postulate (qc7), qc(x − ~zt) = qc(x). Thus, by
the Weak Extensionality Axiom, the theorem follows. For more
details, see [FreKra06, chap.7].
In words, two indiscernible elements z and w, with z ∈ x and
w < x, expressed by their strong-singletons ~zt and ~wt, are
‘permuted’ and the resulting qset x remains indiscernible from
the original one. The hypothesis that ¬(x = [z]t) grants that
there are indiscernible from z in t which do not belong to x. This
theorem has a ‘physical’ interpretation: the qset x must be a neu-
tral atom which is to be ionized by realizing an electron in order
to become a negative ion. Thus the m-object z would represent an
electron in the outer shell, while w is ‘another’ electron not in the
atom (these words are to be understood metaphorically). Thus,
the electron z is realized and, in another experiment, an electron
is captured again so that the atom becomes neutral again. The
question is: is this last neutral atom the same (identical) to the
first one? Of course, this would be so if and only if the captured
electron is, ceteris paribus, exactly the same as the realized one.
But, is there any sense in saying that the realized electron is iden-
tical with the captured one? Quasi-set theory escapes from this
dilemma by assuming that the basic notion is that of indiscerni-
bility; the electrons are indiscernible, so as the neutral atoms.
And this is enough for physics. Philosophically, we have again
our main thesis: the notion of identity is just a useful notion, not
an essential one (in [KraAre15], we discuss this thesis with some
care).
8 A sketch of a quasi-set semantics for quan-
tum languages
The word ‘semantics’ has also acquired a lot of meanings (as ‘on-
tology’ did, as we have seen). In the context that interests us
here, it refers to the possible links between a certain language,
in general a formal language, and certain ‘realities’ that lie out-
side the language. In other words, the task is to attribute meaning
to certain terms of the language in order to say that by using its
resources we can speak of certain entities that form the domains
of application of the language. Of course a formal language, and
the logic of axiomatized theories in general, can make reference
to infinitely many different domains. Usually we chose one of
them to be our intended interpretation. For first order languages
we have a rather well developed theory involving semantics in
this sense, Model Theory. But for more sophisticated languages
(higher-order languages) there is no a general theory of its models,
that is, interpretations where the postulates of the theory are true.
By ‘more sophisticated languages’ I mean mainly the languages
of physical theories, whose models are in general not first-order
structures or, as I prefer to call them, order-1 structures, composed
by a domain (or several domains) and relations and operations
relating and operating with the elements of these domains only.
In physics (and even in mathematics), in general the relations and
operations we have relate (and operate) also with sets of such el-
ements, with functions and matrices formed with them, and so
on. These order-n structures (n > 1) need to be dealt with case by
case. This is particularly so with QM. So, let us analyse minimally
how we can deal with this question in the scope of quasi-set the-
ory.14
In this section I shall sketch a minimal semantics for QM build
in Q. I will postpone to another opportunity the details and
the formal proofs. I will simply justify the general idea of us-
ing quasi-sets to make sense the existence of indistinguishable
but not identical objects. In speaking of ‘quantum languages’,
we need to take some care. Yuri Manin has recalled that quan-
tum mechanics has no its own language, making use of a frag-
ment of the language of standard functional analysis (the Hilbert
space formalism) [Man10, p.80]. But, inspired by Dalla Chiara
and Toraldo di Francia [DalTor93] and by G. Cattaneo [Catt93],
we can suppose a suitable language incorporating the standard
logical vocabulary, plus the following nonlogical symbols:
(i) A collection of monadic predicates Pi (1 = 1, . . . , n) to repre-
sent ‘meaningful properties’ of the quantum systems, the ob-
servables. A typical case may be ‘the value of the spin in the
z-direction’. Let me call P this collection.
(ii) The quantum systems are referred to in different instants of
time (according to the intended interpretation) by individual
parameters (generic names) a1, a2, . . . , am. A parameter acts
here as when we write the equation of a straight line in An-
alytic Geometry as ax + by + c = 0 and say that a, b, c are
parameters ranging on real numbers; we are not specifying
particular numbers, but just making reference to them. So,
14Updated: in 2016, Jonas Arenhart and I published a book where more
details on this discussion are given; see [KraAre16].
the parameters of our language simply refer to quantum sys-
tems without naming them; these parameters are other kind
of variables. It seems clear that the more interesting situations
are when the quantum systems for a collection of indiscernible
entities, like a BEC. In cases like this one is that Q is useful.
(iii) A ternary functional symbol P to be interpreted as proba-
bility in a way to be described below.
The semantics goes as follows. In the classical part of Q, we
can consider all sets referred to below, as for instance the setB(R)
of the Borelians of the real number line. Thus we consider the
following structure as our quantum structure:
QM = 〈S, {Hi}, {Aj}, {Uk},B(R)〉,
where S is a quasi-set suitable for representing the quantum sys-
tems, the Hs are Hilbert spaces, the As are Hermitian operators
defined on suitable Hs, the Us are unitary operators which pro-
vide the dynamic of the system (Schro¨dinger’s equation), and
B(R) is the set of all Borel sets of the real number line. The rules
of interpretation are defined as follows:
(i) The parameters a1, a2 etc. are interpreted either as elements
of S or as subsets of S. Let me observe that in assuming the
structure above, we are introducing explicitly the quantum
systems in the semantic considerations, something that is omit-
ted in the usual approaches (see [DalTor93], [Catt93], [vanF75],
[Ish95, pp.203ff]).
(ii) Each element s ∈ S (or s ⊆ S) is associated to a unitary
Hilbert spaceH ∈ {Hi}, represented by a unitary vector |ψ〉 ∈
H. Composed quantum systems (when s ⊆ S) are associated
to tensor product of Hilbert spaces, as usual.
(iii) The predicates Pj are associated to Hermitian operators
Aˆ ∈ {Aj} of the attributed Hilbert space. The eingenvalues of
Aˆ are the possible outcomes of the measurements made on Pj.
(iv) For any triple 〈s, P,∆〉 ∈ S × P × B(R), we have that
P(s, P,∆) ∈ [0, 1], and this number is interpreted as the prob-
ability that for the physical system in state |ψ〉 (associated to
s), a measurement made in P gives a value in ∆. As in the
standard formulations of QM, we can assume the notion of
probability as given in some suitable way (yet the topic is con-
troversial, as is well known). The postulates describing the
behavior of P) are those of [Mac63, pp.62ff].
Then we can proceed as usual with the quantum formalism
and intended interpretation, but now with the quantum systems
playing a formal role in the developments. Of course more should
be said, but I think that the general idea of using quasi-set theory
is done. Anyway, some simple question can be envisaged, as the
following ones.
8.1 Questions
Some questions are in order, and then we shall see why I have
proposed the use of quasi-sets in the semantics presented above.
As Dalla Chiara and Toraldo di Francia have emphasized, there
are two basic questions to be answers by any semantics for such
a language, namely (here adapted):
(i) Does S or some of its sub collections determine a set of m
elements in the standard set-theoretical sense?
(ii) Can a parameter ai determine a well defined element of S?
As they conclude, “. . . both these questions have a negative
answer” [DalTor93, p.276]. The reasons are easy to find. If in-
distinguishable, a collection of quantum systems should not be
taken as a set of a standard set theory (recall that any attempt
in this sense will be in need of some mathematical trick); sec-
ondly, the denotation function (the rules of interpretation) cannot
be defined as a standard function, for it will not distinguish the
elements of S to which attribute the ai. More could be said, but
this is enough to sustain our argumentation that quasi-set theory
provides a more suitable framework to developed a semantics
for quantum languages.
As I have said, all of this of course deserve further explana-
tions and details. But it is clear that QM works as usual, but now
with a more suitable form of semantics which serves to make
sense of the informal claims about quantum systems. Note that
S may have no a well-defined cardinal number, so this seman-
tics may fit also the case of relativistic quantum mechanics, at
least for free fields, that is, the Hilbert spaces can be taken as
Fock spaces (see [FreKra06, chap.9]). In [Dom et al.08] and in
[Dom et al.10], more is said about the development of QM in Q.
Warning note
This is a revised version of a paper with the same name that was
written by invitation to be published in a book titled The Mam-
moth Book on Quantum Mechanics Interpretations, edited by Open
Academic Press, Berlin, and having as editor a certain Ulf Ed-
vinsson, who has invited me. The book was announced in the
page of OAP and should appear by 2016. This never happened.
Later I discovered that OAP is in a list of predatory editorial
houses and that ”Ulf Edvinsson” is (apparently) a fake name.
Furthermore, I couldn’t contact anyone responding by OAP to
retire my name from the announcement of the book and for im-
peding them to publish the paper. I strongly apologize for such a
fault, which is completely mine. Since the subject presented here
has been among my preoccupations ever since I met Chico Doria
for the first time (in 1987), it is a pleasure to dedicate the stuff to
him. And of course I thank the editors for accepting this version
of the paper for this book.
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